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Abstract: This article probes the sources, manifestations and significances of the ambivalences 
and contradictions in London-based Chinese middle-class male professionals’ sense of their 
own gendered and cultural identities in the context of China’s twenty-first century postsocialist 
modernity. In doing so, it shows how Chinese middle-class men’s sense of themselves connects 
with wider national debates about China’s orientation in the world. To make sense of the desire 
of some respondents “to become a Chinese gentleman”, the article introduces the notion of the 
postsocialist Confucian sublime, a vision of a cultural order of increasing appeal to well-
educated, middle-class Chinese men. The article argues that the Confucian sublime offers 
globally mobile professional Chinese men the opportunity to transcend their ambivalence 
towards Western modernity by providing a sense of wholeness and attainment both at a 
personal level and relating to China’s place in contemporary globality.  
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Facing me across the table in a central London café was a tall, athletically built young man 
called Xianyang. He was from east China, in his mid-twenties, and working for a London-
based multinational IT company when I met him. It was September 2014, and Xianyang was 
one of ten PRC-born Chinese male professionals that I interviewed at that time, their ages 
ranging from early twenties to mid-fifties. I was curious to know their understandings of 
themselves as globally mobile Chinese men working in the heart of Western capitalism. Many 
of my participants had gained higher education degrees in the UK. Xianyang had left China for 
the UK to study as an undergraduate and had continued his studies at postgraduate level. His 
university memories mostly hinged around his quest for a white girlfriend and his envy of the 
success of his white male classmates in dating white girls. 
Xianyang eventually found a UK-educated Chinese girlfriend, yet he had difficulty 
building friendships with his white British middle-class male classmates (although not his non-
white classmates). He told me: “They were all very polite, very gentlemanly, but I sometimes 
wondered if what they said was deep down what they really thought.” Xianyang’s suspicions 
about the integrity of his white British middle-class classmates extended to misgivings about 
their sexual behavior, which he hesitantly described when articulating his goal for his own 
gendered subjectivity: 
 
Appearance-wise, I want to be an English gentleman, but internally I prefer to be a 
Chinese gentleman. British guys dress well and are very polite, but internally I don’t 
think [pause], the way they treat girls [pause], and some of the things [pause]. I talked 
with my girlfriend [pause]; she doesn’t actually like British guys. She thinks some of 
them are playboys; I don’t know if it’s true. But I want to become a Chinese gentleman. 
 
When previously analysing the masculinities of professional Chinese men in London, 
I mentioned the “ambivalences and contradictions” apparent in Xianyang’s and other men’s 
sense of their masculine identities (Hird, 2016b). This article probes further into such 
ambivalences: their sources, manifestations, significance, and consequences. It explores 
globally mobile, London-based Chinese middle-class male professionals’ sense of their own 
gendered and cultural identities in the context of China’s twenty-first century postsocialist 
modernity. 1  In doing so, it shows how Chinese middle-class men’s sense of themselves 
                                                 
1 I recognize that “middle class” is a contested term, not least in China, and that the so-called middle class or 
middle stratum in China is particularly heterogeneous and inchoate however it is defined (see e.g. Li 2010). 
Most of my informants worked for private companies; three worked for state or third-sector organisations. None 
of them held managerial positions senior enough to warrant elite “gold-collar” status. Professionals (zhuanye 
renshi 专业人士) are generally considered one of the middle strata in prominent Chinese sociologies of class 
(see e.g. Lu 2010), hence my designation of my informants as middle class. I follow Zhang Xudong’s definition 
of postsocialism in the Chinese context, which captures how newly emerging formations are informed by a 
persisting mission of differentiation from a Western-inflected global capitalist order: “the post- in postsocialism 
indicates a new socioeconomic and cultural-political subjectivity which prefigures the new but is embedded in 
connects with wider national debates about China’s orientation in the world.  
To make sense of the desire “to become a Chinese gentleman”, I introduce the notion 
of the postsocialist Confucian sublime, a vision of a cultural order of increasing appeal to well-
educated, middle-class Chinese men. 2  As I will demonstrate through the concept of the 
Confucian sublime, globally mobile professional Chinese men, in discursive representations 
and self-presentations, may transcend ambivalence towards Western modernity through 
embracing an imaginary of the Confucian sublime that provides a sense of wholeness and 
attainment both at a personal level and for China’s place in contemporary globality.  
 
Chinese masculinities and the nation 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Zhong Xueping diagnosed post-Mao Chinese male 
intellectuals as suffering from a “male marginality complex”: a “preoccupation with the 
weakness of the country, the culture, and Chinese men” (2000, 37). Male intellectuals’ sense 
of marginalisation was compounded by their feeling emasculated by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), Western men, and Chinese women. But, Zhong emphasises, male intellectuals 
were unwilling to remain in the margins; on the contrary, they harboured a desire to build a 
strong, potent Chinese masculinity recognised across the world. Indeed, in Zhong’s view, the 
search for a reinvigorated masculinity has always been inherent to China’s quest for a modern 
national identity (2000, 14).  
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the response of China’s male intellectuals to the 
imposition of Western modernity has taken the forms of cultural repudiation, such as the anti-
Confucianism of New Culture intellectuals in the early 20th century, and cultural nationalism, 
seen in the 1980s’ root-seeking movement and the post-Tiananmen revival of “traditional” 
culture. Yet both cultural “nihilism” and cultural nationalism share a “desire to ‘masculinize’ 
Chinese culture” (Zhong 2000, 169). The New Culture intellectuals sought ways to banish 
China’s reputation as the “sick man of East Asia”, the root-seekers celebrated a tough, earthy 
                                                 
an order of things that does not readily recognize the ideological claim, political legitimacy, and cultural validity 
of capitalist globalization for the totality of human history and its future horizon” (2008: 12). 
2 In current Chinese aesthetic discourses, 崇高 (chongggao, “lofty and towering”) is the most common way of 
rendering the sublime; other terms include 壮美 (zhuangmei, “magnificent and beautiful”)，宏壮 (hongzhuang, 
“great and magnificent”)，至大 (zhida, “extremely grand”)，至刚 (zhigang “extremely strong”) and 雄伟 
(xiongwei, masculine and mighty). Comparative concepts include 阳刚之气 (yanggang zhi qi, “manly and 
unyielding spirit”), 风骨 (fenggu, “wind and bone”), 雄浑 (xionghun, “masculine whole”) (Wang 1997, 8, 10). 
However, my focus in this essay is not on how the sublime or its equivalents have been or should be rendered in 
Chinese, but in tracing the sublime, through the lens of contemporary Chinese masculinities, as a movement 
towards transcendence of male anxieties and desires and ultimately emancipation in a masculine-gendered 
realm. Exemplifications of this sublimation process abound in Chinese philosophical writings, literature, and 
film (Wang 1997, passim).  
peasant manhood, and today’s Confucian revivalists acclaim retro-models of masculinity from 
China’s classical canon. It is hard to disagree with Zhong’s observation that “issues of 
masculinity constitute an intrinsic part of our understanding of Chinese modernity” (2000, 12).  
Why might Chinese intellectuals show such conflicted feelings towards Western 
modernity? Reworking a proposition found in Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History, the 
Russianist Frank Seeley (1952: 92-4) suggested that in their role as localising conduits of 
Western culture under the unequal terms of Western expansionism, non-Western intelligentsias 
are inherently conflicted in their identification with Western and local cultures and feel 
alienated from both. Toynbee’s mistake, in Seeley’s view, was to overestimate the allegiance 
of non-Western intelligentsias to Western cultural imperialism. In similar vein, Werner 
Meissner (2006: 42-3) notes that Russian, German, Arab and Chinese intellectuals, among 
others, were and/or are equivocal in their endeavours to modernise their societies, caught 
between Western and local “spiritual cultures”. 
 Do Chinese male professionals feel caught between two cultures, alienated by both? 
Do they veer between cultural nihilism and nationalism? Are they explicit—or tacit—male 
chauvinists? Many Chinese male professionals have been educated in Western countries and 
are often regarded as being the most ‘Westernised’ segment of China’s population. According 
to modernisation theory, the middle class are the ever-Westernising and ever-expanding 
vanguard of China’s developing society: they are the ones who will ensure that China and the 
Chinese become more like the “advanced” economies and societies. Yet the spirit of the 
Chinese male intellectual tradition, of which some of my participants portrayed themselves as 
the inheritors, informs the views of today’s highly educated middle-class male professionals. I 
argue in this paper that some – perhaps many – Chinese middle-class men feel highly 
ambivalent about their cultural affiliations; and, some of them seek to transcend their quandary 
through the aesthetics of the Confucian sublime: the seductive vision of an idealized Confucian 
political order, ruled over by virtuous men. 
The split subject of non-Western modernising nations and his affiliations with local 
value systems are analysed below through the postcolonial approaches of Homi Bhabha (1994) 
and Partha Chatterjee (1993), and via the notions of the “cosmopolitan patriot” and the 
“cosmopatriot” offered by Kwame Anthony Appiah (1997) and Jeroen de Kloet (2007) 
respectively. My understanding of ambivalence and its transcendence in the Chinese context is 
informed by Zhong Xueping’s (2000) concept of the “knowing subject”, whose male paranoia 
is sublimated into a universalizing vision of the world. To aid my theorization of the Confucian 
sublime I have turned to Ban Wang (1997).  
 
Cosmopolitanism, ambivalence, and the Confucian sublime 
Notions of cosmopolitanism and ambivalence are useful for examining gender, class, cultural 
and national dimensions in middle-class Chinese masculinities. Kwame Anthony Appiah has 
written of the “cosmopolitan patriot”: a “rooted cosmopolitan”, the cosmopolitan patriot has 
his or her own sense of cultural home, yet also enjoys the differences afforded by cultural 
homes of others (1997, 618). Jeroen de Kloet has developed the figure of the Chinese 
“cosmopatriot” who imbues Chineseness with a sense of cosmopolitanism and vice versa (de 
Kloet 2007, 134). For De Kloet, Chinese cosmopatriotism occurs in three ways: cultural 
struggles that localise globally circulating ideas and practices (exemplified in Chinese hip hop); 
cultural criticism that disrupts notions of cultural purity (as in the art of Xu Bing); and playful 
anticulturalism that abandons any pretentions towards cultural essences (as in Stephen Chow’s 
Kung Fu Hustle). Cultural struggle is the category that most aptly fits the ambivalence of 
Chinese middle-class men’s conflicted aspirations to, on the one hand, globally circulating 
ideals that include progressive gender attitudes, and, on the other hand, embedded notions and 
practices of masculinity that perpetuate national and male chauvinisms. Lisa Rofel (2007, 111) 
conceptualises this general phenomenon as “domestication of cosmopolitanism by way of 
renegotiating China’s place in the world”, and provides an example of her young Chinese 
female informants, who desire to be single, autonomous global consumers, yet simultaneously 
wish to inhabit the conventional role of the “respectable, married woman” (Rofel 2007, 125–
6). For De Kloet and Rofel, Chinese localizations of globally circulating notions and practices 
are characterized by ambivalence and contradiction. 
The works of Homi Bhabha and Partha Chatterjee on the formation of colonial 
subjectivities and the cultural sphere in the historical context in India provide helpful 
perspectives on the formation of middle-class masculinities and claims to national cultural 
identities that are occurring in contemporary China. Bhabha (1994, 55) proposes that colonial 
subjectivities are typified by a split subject that exhibits ambivalent and divided identifications, 
rendering the notion of pure cultural identity unsustainable. On the one hand, the colonial 
subject wishes to mimic the behaviour and lifestyles of elite metropolitans; on the other hand, 
he or she also wants to forge a cultural identity that differs from the colonisers’. These tugs in 
contradictory directions in the subjectification process reveal “the boundaries of colonial 
discourse” (Bhabha 1994: 96).  
In the current era, notions of cosmopolitanism premised on Western metropolitanism 
rework the discourses of colonial times, inscribing an otherness in non-Western contexts that 
is simultaneously desired and derided. Chatterjee (1993) points out that the search for 
postcolonial modernity inevitably connects with historic struggles against Western modernity. 
Using the example of Bengal, Chatterjee (1993, 7–9) argues that from the mid-19th century—
before the political challenge to imperialism— colonized non-Western elites asserted an inner 
domain of spiritual culture built on difference from the West. Key elements in the spiritual-
cultural sphere were the family, the position of women, and national forms of literature and art, 
which were to be wrought modern yet simultaneously marked by national essence.  
In semi-colonised China in the second half of the 19th century, the earliest generation 
of modernizing figures associated with the foreign-learning faction (yangwu pai 洋务派) or 
self-strengthening movement (ziqiang yundong 自强运动), such as Zeng Guofan 曾国藩 
(1811-1872), Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 (1823-1901), Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 (1812-1885), and 
Zhang Zhidong 张之洞 (1837-1909) similarly made a division between spiritual and material 
spheres. “Chinese learning as substance, Western learning for application” (Zhongxue wei ti, 
Xixue wei yong 中学为体，西学为用) became their core guiding principle. In postsocialist 
China, Zeng Guofan has become a totemic model of a patriotic, well-educated Chinese man, 
due to his welcome of Western technology where it strengthened the nation, but also his 
cultivation of a strongly Confucian moral image (Meissner 2006: 49). Zeng’s association with 
the foreign-learning faction marked him as a cosmopolitan-like figure of his time. A hero of 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s, Zeng became a taboo figure during the high socialism of the Mao years, 
but since the 1980s has been acclaimed by cultural nationalists as “an exemplary Confucian 
man of literary and professional achievements and moral excellence” and a seminal modernizer 
of industry and education (Guo 2004: 53, 55). 
 Zeng’s case is but one example of how male Chinese scholars throughout Chinese 
history have striven to bring themselves and Chinese society towards an idealized realm of 
Confucian-based order of harmonious social relations. As a process, this involves the 
containment of sexual desire and the perfecting of one’s moral character through self-
cultivation (Louie 2015: 113). If sublimation is “the converting of libidinal energies to serve 
culturally acceptable goals” (Wang 1997: 13), then this is the Confucian sublime.  
From its earliest days, the Confucian sublime has been associated with lofty visions of 
political rule by virtuous men: “Grandeur belonged to men’s vigorous enterprises and moral 
pursuits” (Wang 1997, 105). It was thus coded masculine (yang 阳) in the dominant yin-yang 
cosmological system. According to Mencius, the Confucian gentleman was distinguishable for 
his cultivation of “an infinitely magnificent and strong” masculine vitality: 阳刚之气 
(yanggang zhi qi, manly and unyielding spirit) (Wang 1997: 106).3 This masculine grandeur 
has been maintained for millennia through misogynistic suppression of the feminine (Wang 
1997, 118). During the Republican Era, China’s foremost twentieth-century Chinese 
aesthetician, Zhu Guangqian 朱光潜 (1897-1986), built on this rejection of the feminine in his 
hybrid Chinese-Western conceptualisation of the sublime (Wang 1997: 114-22). In his highly 
influential Psychology of Literature (Wenyi xinli xue 文艺心理学, 1936), Zhu equated the 
Western sublime with the notion of yanggang zhi qi, emphasizing its correlation with strength 
(gang 刚); he aligned the beautiful, in contrast, with the idea of (feminine) gentleness and 
softness (rou 柔) (Wang 1997: 115).4 Maoist discourse continued the elevation of a masculine 
aesthetic, albeit in socialist hues, as a means of containing the feminine at a time when women 
were enjoined to “hold up half the sky” (ding banbian tian 顶半边天) (Wang 1997: 107-14).  
Chinese male intellectuals’ sense of besiegement and ambivalence towards “body and 
self” in the shifting contexts of the immediate post-Mao era led them to search for a new 
sublime to transcend their sense of conflictedness and in which to locate a “new self” (Zhong 
2000: 12). In the root-seeking literature of the 1980s, nature is the sublime state into which 
male writers projected their idealized selves, expressed through earthy, untamed, free-
spirited—and male dominated—peasant-farmer lives and values in works like Mo Yan’s Red 
Sorghum (Hong gaoliang 红高粱 1986) and Han Shaogong’s Da Da Da (Bababa 爸爸爸, 
1985) (Zhong 2000: 159). Han’s “manifesto” for root-seeking literature posits ancient Chu 
culture as a mysterious, half-primitive, yet strongly masculinist pre-Confucian idyll (Zhong 
2000: 154-5). It was through such imagined cultural roots that the root-seekers fashioned 
strongly patriarchal and patrilineal accounts of uncontaminated Chinese cultural identity 
(Zhong 2000: 163). These re-masculinised and re-racialised fantasies of the Han people’s rural 
origins provided refuge from male intellectuals’ despair with their personal and China’s 
realities; and replaced as cultural ideal the (by then discredited) urban socialist utopia promised 
by the Great Helmsman.  
 Male paranoia was transcended through its sublimation into a “universal wholeness” 
based on “an internal whole self”, constituting a male subject that refused to acknowledge 
                                                 
3 “Manly and unyielding spirit” is Haun Saussy’s translation of yanggang zhi qi, which Wang Ban commends 
for encompassing “both the literal surface and deep cultural connotations of the phrase” (1997: 272 n. 9). 
4 Zhu’s friend, the poet Liang Zongdai 梁宗岱 (1903-83), attempted to construct a feminine- (yin 阴) based 
theory of the sublime, which anticipated some avant-garde literature attempts in the late 1980s to de-masculinize 
the sublime (Wang 1997: 118-22). 
himself as a fragmented self, but rather saw himself as a “knowing subject capable of 
eventually returning to the center of an orderly world” (Zhong 2000: 100). In this knowing 
subject’s view, the external world is fragmented, not himself. The features of the orderly world 
or sublime realm within which the knowing subject aspires to exist are influenced by the 
“dominant fiction” of the subject’s discursive and social environments (Zhong 2000: 98).  
The Confucian moral order was the sought-after sublime for the majority of “knowing 
male subjects” in China’s imperial era; since then, dominant notions of the sublime in China 
have demonstrated commingling of Western and Chinese conceptions, such as in Zhu 
Guangqian’s theoretical assemblage, the convergence of socialism and Confucian paternalism 
in Mao, or the return-to-nature romanticism of the root-seekers. In the idealised Confucian 
sublime, postsocialist knowing male subjects mix together yearnings for Confucian moral order 
and hierarchy, cultivated personhood, and globally projected Chinese male power. Yet their 
attraction to a Confucian cultural-spiritual ethos coexists with their desire for recognition at a 
global level as enlightened modern male subjects committed to gender equality. Not accepting 
of marginalisation in the world’s eyes and tugged ambivalently between “Chinese” and 
“Western” modernities, some eventually find a sense of completeness in a Confucian-inflected 
moral order with global reach.  
 
Methodology 
In the following pages, I explore ambivalence and its transcendence in political and cultural 
representations of Chinese masculinities and in Chinese middle-class men’s self-narrations. 
My primary sources include contemporary Chinese news articles, TV drama, literature, and 
data from interviews that I conducted with professional Chinese men in London. I investigate 
diverse spheres because of my conceptualisation of masculinities as fluid assemblages of 
multiple discursive practices that individuals negotiate in subjectification processes (Song and 
Hird 2014). My analysis is informed by critical masculinity studies, which insists upon a focus 
on gendered power relations (O’Neill 2015). For the interviews, I followed methods associated 
with narrative inquiry, a methodological approach that is particularly suited to exploring the 
experiences of a single person or a small number of people (Cresswell 2012: 73-4; Kim 2015: 
161). Narrative inquiry can be used to investigate personal experiences of an event or 
phenomenon, such as this paper’s exploration of gendered transnational mobilities and 
imaginaries. The interview data that is generated through narrative inquiry methods is itself the 
result of an assemblage of multiple contingent elements, including “dominant and changing 
discourses, […] biography, perspective, interests, and the immediate pertinences of the 
process” (Gubrium and Holstein 2012: 40). 
Through bilingual adverts in Chinese and English circulated by community 
organizations, friends and associates, I recruited ten research participants, all of whom were 
professional Chinese men living in London. London was chosen as the site of inquiry because 
of the significant numbers of highly educated Chinese men from the PRC living and working 
there, many of them graduates from universities in the UK.5 Most of my participants had come 
to the UK to study and were educated to at least Master’s level. Their ages ranged from early 
twenties to mid-fifties; and they had lived in the UK for between three and twenty-six years. 
Four were married (all to Chinese women and all had children), three were partnered (including 
one civil partner), and three were single; eight identified themselves as straight and two as gay. 
They worked in media (three), architecture (two), and the others in finance, design, computing, 
commodities research (in large British private-sector companies) and academia. I interviewed 
each participant for between one and two hours between October 2014 and March 2015 and 
subsequently had follow-up discussions with five participants in informal social situations. 
My approach builds a story of transnational Chinese masculinities shaped by my 
involvement in the co-creation of interview data, selection of discursive instances, choice of 
theoretical lens, and ultimately interpretation of all these elements. I do not seek to claim that 
my findings are “representative” of all transnational Chinese professional men. In the spirit of 
constructivist grounded theory, the scholarly value of this paper may rather inhere in its 
provision of “concepts and hypotheses that other researchers can transport to similar research 
problems and to other substantive fields” (Pace 2012: 9, drawing from Charmaz 2000).  
 
Political and cultural representations of Chinese masculinities 
Masculinist Confucian tropes have found their way back into political and popular discourse 
during the reform era. It is significant that since taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping has 
emphasised the importance of the moral order of the family to Chinese society, calling for 
attention to “the family, family education, and family values” (zhuzhong jiating, zhuzhong 
jiajiao, zhuzhong jiafeng 注重家庭，注重家教，注重家风). Explaining the “unique role” of 
women in the family, Xi has identified their main service to the country as caring for the elderly 
and educating children (Nehring and Wang 2016: 4). By describing the perfect wife as 
                                                 
5 The UK is the most popular destination for overseas study among the Chinese middle class besides the US 
(Xue 2019). 
“virtuous” (qi xian 妻贤) and the perfect mother as “kind” (mu ci 母慈), Xi has reproduced the 
well-worn trope that the stability of the household, headed by a patriarch, rests on the shoulders 
of the virtuous wife and good mother.6 As examples of good mothering, Xi has cited two stories 
that every Chinese schoolchild knows: the devotion of Mencius’ mother to her son, and General 
Yue Fei’s mother’s insistence that he defend the country rather than care for her. Xi has 
recounted that his own mother seared the story of Yue Fei into his memory when young.7 His 
message is clear: a good mother sacrifices her own interests for those of her son.  
Xi’s approach to the family emphasises Confucian and nationalist elements. His choice 
of Mencius and Yue Fei as masculine models underlines the ancient ideal that Chinese men 
should balance 文 (wen, cultural attainment) and 武 (wu, martial valour) and also seizes the 
chance to laud the fervent nationalism with which Yue Fei is associated. In speeches, Xi has 
encouraged hierarchal Confucian family relationships by exhorting younger brothers to respect 
elder brothers (di gong 弟恭) and all children to be filial (zi xiao 子孝). According to Xi, 
Confucian family morals were espoused and practiced by socialist heroes such as Zhou Enlai, 
Zhu De and Mao Zedong.8 
Xi clearly values the moral order of Confucianism as a means of promoting cultural 
nationalist, masculinist, and generational hierarchies; and he undoubtedly recognises how 
Confucianism served the interests of imperial rule for 2000 years. In this context, the aesthetics 
of the sublime envisioned by Xi, evidently a knowing subject in this regard, take on a strongly 
Confucian hue. Yet Xi has also stressed his commitment to gender equality before the United 
Nations General Assembly9 and the All-China Women’s Federation.10 His pronouncements on 
gender and the family exemplify the kind of ambivalence to modernity and linkage of the 
spiritual-cultural sphere with national identity that Chatterjee outlined. 
Besides political discourse, popular culture is a prominent vehicle for the propagation 
of masculinist and cultural nationalist values. A recent development in TV drama is the 
                                                 
6 Xi Jinping 习近平. 2016. “在会见第一届全国文明家庭代表时的讲话” (Zai huijian diyijie quanguo 
wenming jiating daibiao shi de jianghua, Address at the first national meeting of representatives from civilized 
families), Xinhuanet, 15 December 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-12/15/c_1120127183.htm 
(accessed on 6 May 2019). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Somini Sengupta. 2015. “Xi Jinping Vows to ‘Reaffirm’ China’s Commitment to Women’s Rights,” The New 
York Times, 27 September 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/28/world/asia/china-united-nations-
womens-rights.html (accessed on 6 May 2019). 
10 “习近平：组织动员妇女走在时代前列建功立业” (Xi Jinping: zuzhi dongyuan funü zou zai shidai qianlie 
jiangong-liye, Xi Jinping: organise and mobilise women to walk in the forefront of the times to render 
meritorious service and build successful careers), Xinhuanet, 2 November 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-11/02/c_1123654725.htm (accessed on 31 July 2019). 
blending together of cosmopolitanism, male privilege and Chinese cultural exceptionalism. As 
Geng Song (2018) has pointed out, the online novel turned hit TV series Love Me, If You Dare 
(Ta lai le, qing bi yan 他来了，请闭眼), broadcast in 2015, presents an interesting case study 
through the cosmopolitan characterization of its male lead, Bo Jinyan 薄靳言, a Western 
educated Chinese professor of criminology who helps the police with murder cases. Bo is both 
intellectual and middle class, as much at home in Western societies as in China. And yet Love 
Me, If You Dare reproduces a stereotypical pattern of sexual relationships in reform era Chinese 
films, as a hierarchal relationship exists between the globe-trotting, highly educated Bo and his 
girlfriend Jian Yao 简瑶, in which Bo is unquestionably dominant and Jian is subservient and 
uncomplaining (Song 2018: 32-3). Bo is also the dominant party in his relationship with his 
close male friend, Fu Ziyu 傅子遇, who plays an almost feminized role in supporting Bo’s 
ambitions. As Song points out, this “is reminiscent of the yin/yang hierarchy in same-sex 
relationships in the Chinese space” (2018: 36). A Confucian-inflected framework of family 
and social relationships is at work in the background here.  
A further relevant point is that Bo’s immense mental acuity and work ethic enable him 
to outperform Westerners and solve tough murder cases with ease. Bo’s confident outsmarting 
of his white counterparts, coupled with his cosmopolitan fluency in Western languages and 
cultures, positions him as a master of the global stage. Behind this triumph of Chinese male 
intellectuality there lies a vindication of the value given to education in the Chinese tradition, 
and the notion that self-disciplined scholarliness is the route to success. Bo vanquishes Chinese 
men’s emasculation by Western men and Chinese women with ease, resolving the anxieties 
and ambivalence that well-educated Chinese men feel about their place in the world. He is an 
idealized model of Chinese masculinity in early 21st century globality: a cosmopolitan, 
privileged, and confident knowing male subject, who inhabits a Chinese masculinist and 
culturalist sublime. 
A confident, cosmopolitan, middle-class intellectual Chinese masculinity also animates 
the persona and writings of the novelist Feng Tang 冯唐  (b. 1971). Medically trained, 
possessing an American MBA, and an ex-consultant for an American management consulting 
firm, Feng lauds the sexual openness of Western writers such as D. H. Lawrence and Henry 
Miller, and interacts with his fans in sexually suggestive ways. Referring to Feng’s activity on 
his hugely popular page on the social media platform Weibo, Pamela Hunt writes: 
 
Reading his posts, one cannot fail to miss a trend on his page, wherein young women 
(and very occasionally, men), post pictures of themselves posing with one of more of 
his books. The photos are clearly intended to be cute or even provocative, with the 
occasional inclusion of pictures of partially nude women. They are frequently 
accompanied by emojis of hearts or kisses, and references to Feng Tang as their “Dream 
boy.” These pictures are then reposted by Feng with the suggestive phrase “Tonight we 
are really enjoying ourselves.” (Hunt 2018: 118) 
 
Hunt discusses the rampant male sexuality in Feng’s work through Sheldon Lu’s (2000) notion 
of the transnational libidinal economy, which produces “masculinist, macho and sexually 
aggressive” Chinese men, especially desirous of white women, as seen in Chinese TV dramas 
and other cultural works since the 1990s (2018, 107).  
Yet while Feng and his characters are formed through enthusiastic exposure to Western 
women, brands and popular culture, the spirit of the historical figure of the talented and 
libidinous young male scholar (caizi 才子) simultaneously permeates Feng and his fiction 
(Hunt 2018: 114). For instance, Feng’s protagonist in his Beijing Trilogy attributes the 
“lascivious” air on Peking University’s campus to the presence of caizi there for centuries, and 
Feng has written about sharing an enjoyment of “white-skinned women” with Li Yu 李渔 
(1611-80 CE), author of the erotic classic, The Carnal Prayer Mat (Rouputuan 肉蒲团), whose 
protagonist is a philandering young scholar (Hunt 2018, 115, 117). 
Feng’s evocation of the well-educated and highly sexed caizi locates Feng within a 
long-standing Chinese male-centric tradition that marginalizes and objectifies women. In 
Feng’s works, Maoist high socialism is presented as inhibiting; it is the “historical culture of 
sensuality” to which Feng returns (Hunt 2018, 115). Feng’s authorial persona and fictional 
protagonists share the cosmopolitanism of Bo Jinyan in Love Me, If You Dare, but they inhabit 
the Confucian traditions of the privileged male scholar in even more pronounced ways. 
Ultimately, Feng presents himself as a knowing male subject, nested in a caizi-inflected, male-
centred imaginary of the sublime, a fantasy realm where both men and women can apparently 
reach a state of bliss. 
 
Chinese professional men’s self-narratives  
I return now to Xianyang’s account of his life in the UK as a Chinese man, with which I began 
this article. We have already established that Xianyang desired a white woman for a girlfriend, 
which can be understood in the wider context of globally mobile Chinese men, in everyday life 
and on the television screen, seeking affirmation of their sexual attractiveness from desirable 
white women. Viewed through the lens of the Chinese male marginality complex discussed 
above, this quest can be understood as globally mobile Chinese men’s desire to possess as 
strong and potent a sexuality as that of white men, and to overcome their and China’s history 
of emasculation. As Joane Nagel (1998) has influentially argued, the strength of a nation and 
its men are inextricably linked in modern nation-building.  
Although Xianyang wanted to cultivate the attributes of a Chinese gentleman, he still 
wished to look like the sophisticated young middle-class men in his university classes and had 
sought to mould an outward appearance that reflected the sartorial elegance and refined manner 
that he admired in British middle-class men. But he emphasized that “dressing is a very 
superficial thing: what matters more is how you think – your inner content (neihan 内涵)”. In 
that sentence, Xianyang revealed his ambivalence towards the “modern” masculinity that he 
aimed to emulate. On the one hand, Xianyang admired his classmates’ suave demeanour, he 
wanted to look like them, to possess their social skills, to be as sexually attractive as they 
seemed to be; on the other hand, he had a sense of an inner, cultural, Chinese masculinity, that 
did not square with the masculinity projected by his classmates. Revealingly, Xianyang 
confided that one of his heroes was the author and ex-management consultant Feng Tang, 
saying that Feng combined the historical attributes of Chinese wen masculinity with savviness 
in contemporary global business culture. 
Xianyang added that what he meant by “Chinese gentleman,” (a term he had said in 
English hitherto), was the junzi 君子, the archetypal moral exemplar of the Confucian canon. 
He elaborated: 
 
Like in more ancient times, Tang, Song: the scholars of the Confucian school (rujia 儒
家) were polite, they took care of their family, they cared about society’s problems, 
they took care of the whole universe. I think that’s the most important thing – they 
always considered the well-being of the whole people, regardless of nation. I don’t 
really like the notion of nation, government, party, Chinese Communist Party. Junzi 
care more about the people and focus on internal cultivation. A good definition of the 
junzi is that they do not do immoral things that they could do when they are alone; they 
could benefit from doing them, but they decide not to do them. I think the basic idea 
combining external and internal gentlemanly characteristics works regardless of 
country. If you’re a good man, you have these good characteristics, and if you treat 
people that way, people will like you. I don’t just see myself as Chinese, I like to be a 
global citizen. In high school I wrote an article and developed a theory to prioritize 
things in my mind – the first thing I wrote was I would die for was “all under heaven” 
(tianxia 天下), then parents, then country (guojia 国家), then my woman, then myself. 
 
Xianyang sets out here a cosmopolitan model of junzi masculinity that transcends national 
boundaries in its use of the Confucian concept of tianxia, “all under heaven”. Within this larger 
global context, Xianyang retains a strong sense of the distinctive characteristics of scholarly 
Chinese masculinity, its strengths, priorities and its goal of sublime self-perfection 
encapsulated in the junzi ideal. Indeed, the way of the junzi has historically been considered 
“the foundation of the sublime spirit” (chonggao jingshen de genji 崇高精神的根基) in 
Chinese aesthetics (Zhu 2016: 42-3).  
Xianyang’s reconstruction of the junzi as an idealised transnational figure forges a 
confident Chinese male cultural identity in a sublime vision of a global tianxia. It combines 
the polished, urbane “external gentlemanly characteristics” that he observed in his British 
classmates with a steadfast attention to “inner cultivation” of lofty moral practices. The inner 
spiritual dimension to Xianyang’s masculinity encompasses precisely those elements that 
Chatterjee identified as the chief concerns of postcolonial elites: paradigms from national 
literatures, the family, and marital relations. Xianyang’s domestication of a cosmopolitanism 
masculinity reveals his ambivalence and unease about the masculinities of Western modernity, 
and his need to transcend this ambivalence – and his fragmented self – by seeking the 
harmonious order of junzi and tianxia. Xianyang is far from alone in this: in recent Chinese 
political discourse, both concepts have been promoted as counterpoints to established Western 
frameworks of world order. Elsewhere, I have analysed the presentation of junzi as Chinese 
national archetype and leaders of an imagined “junzi nation” (Hird 2017). William Callahan 
sets out how tianxia is formulated as “a patriotic form of cosmopolitanism”, offering a top-
down “hierarchical system that values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite 
governance over democracy and human rights” (Callahan 2008: 753, 759).  
Xianyang was not the only admirer of junzi masculinity that I met. Bradley, the son of 
officials, in his mid-twenties, and a design professional, had moved to the UK from south China 
for his secondary school education. In similar fashion to Xianyang, he emphasized self-
cultivation of a junzi masculinity: 
 
Mencius put it clearly: life is about self-cultivation. Confucianism puts it as cultivation 
of personal morals. Yu Qiuyu11 says the junzi is the cultural ideal of China, like the 
samurai is for Japan. China needs more self-cultivation to be taught; the attention paid 
to creams, designer clothes, hairstyles, doesn’t make for interesting character. 
 
The different perspective that Bradley gained from living in the West led him to pinpoint what 
he saw as a major problem with contemporary Chinese society, namely the lack of a culturally 
specific moral counterbalance to the hyper-consumerism that has spread in recent years. He 
continued: 
 
What’s missing is that self-cultivation is not being taught. I realized the importance of 
that after I came to the West. I think self-cultivation is a natural thing. The way you 
explore knowledge, change your views, have an ideal that you want to become. You 
want to become good at this and that – you are cultivating already. 
 
Bradley’s choice of words – “what’s missing…” – reveals his sense of his own and 
Chinese society’s incompleteness. Bradley’s search for meaning beyond consumerism and a 
sense of wholeness in his life led him to Confucian practices of self-cultivation, which he 
explicitly linked to national cultural identity discourses propagated by public intellectuals such 
as Yu Qiuyu, who argues that the junzi model of self-cultivation is the core of Chineseness. 
Bradley’s transcendence of his sense of incompleteness as a Chinese man, his becoming a 
knowing subject, is linked very clearly into a vision of a strong national culture for the Chinese 
nation. 
I had asked Bradley, as I did Xianyang, for an account of his life in the UK as a Chinese 
man. Instead, he propounded his views on the weakness of China and the need for Chinese men 
to embrace their cultural destiny through walking the path of the junzi. As he saw it, the antidote 
to the amoral hyper-consumerism imported from the West was the practice of self-cultivation. 
In Bradley’s view, Chinese gentlemanly masculinity was crucial not only for his own sense of 
manhood, but also for the health of the Chinese nation as a whole: masculinity and national 
culture came together for him through the sublime figure of the junzi. 
The promotion of a masculinity founded on Confucian self-cultivation was not merely 
                                                 
11 Yu Qiuyu 余秋雨 (1946–) is a well-known writer and commentator on – and strong proponent of – Chinese 
cultural heritage. In Hird (2017) I analyse his conceptualization of the junzi. 
desirable, Bradley argued, but vital, due to China’s political system. He posited Chinese 
political difference on a cultural foundation: 
 
I guess the Chinese way is harsher, more strict. Because Confucian self-cultivation 
cultivates one towards power, like a man who can hold so much power without being 
corrupt – that’s a much higher standard. I don’t think Western men need to, because 
you have factions in government, you have independent trade unions, you will never 
give a man that much power, therefore there is no need for one single character to have 
such high moral standards as Xi Jinping 习近平 (1953–); or Wen Jiabao 温家宝 (1942–
). Wen Jiabao is considered a man of strong morals. And no Western man will ever be 
equal to him in the amount of power he can amass. 
 
Bradley’s notably male-centred rendering of Chinese politics asserted that the stability of the 
system hinged on the moral self-cultivation of its leaders. As Guo Xuezhi points out, in the 
Confucian tradition the combination of a ruler’s active ethical responsibility for self and society 
is conceptualized through the figure of the junzi as moral model and ideal political leader (2001: 
55-7). The connection between politics, morality and the sublime is present in China most 
canonical Confucian texts: “The tendency to render political rule and moral integrity as an 
experience of the grandiose and the lofty is quite pronounced in the Confucian Analects” 
(Wang 1997: 105). Exhilarated by Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, Bradley talked of the 
CCP staying in power, like a dynasty, for two or three hundred years, provided that its leaders 
successfully fostered junzi morality.  
The qualities that Bradley wished to see in elite Chinese men came together for him in 
the figure of the nineteenth-century general Zeng Guofan, whose popularity among 
contemporary cultural nationalists I discussed above. Bradley emphasized that Zeng cultivated 
a masculinity that incorporated Confucian (and some Daoist) principles, while advocating 
strengthening of the nation through adoption of Western technological, military and 
educational innovations. Besides admiring Zeng for saving the nation from the chaos of the 
Taiping rebellion (1850-1864), Bradley most appreciated Zeng’s strength of moral character; 
which Guo Yingjie has summed up as “the four principal ideals of the Confucian man 
(achieving self-perfection, managing the family, governing the empire, and bringing order to 
all under heaven)” (2004: 62). For Bradley and other contemporary well-educated cultural 
nationalists, it is Confucian self-cultivation, coupled with a globally informed perspective, as 
exemplified by Zeng, that produces the moral fibre and vision in elite men that is required to 
safeguard China’s political and cultural integrity, social stability, and economic prosperity. 
The assertion of a superior moral core at the heart of Chinese masculinity and Chinese 
national culture, particularly with regard to the family, women, and self-control, was a 
prominent feature of the opinions of another four of my research participants, all professional 
Chinese men, during the interviews I carried out in London in 2014. These participants 
expressed disappointment with aspects of British men’s behaviour, especially in family 
contexts and relations with women. They felt that there was an unacceptably high level of 
absent fathers in UK families, and that British men were not as filial (xiao 孝) as they should 
be. They contrasted this with their sense of Chinese men’s acceptance of responsibility for their 
families, especially in terms of duties of care towards their children and parents. My 
participants also felt that British men were unacceptably sexually lewd towards women on the 
streets and even in the workplace. Further examples of irresponsible behaviour that they gave 
included British men’s public drunkenness, aggressiveness, and football hooliganism.  
Contrasting with such adherence to mainstream Confucian values, one man whom I 
interviewed, Zhen Feng, articulated the alternative vision of the Daoist-inflected Chu cultural 
sublime proposed by Han Shaogong in the mid-1980s. A media professional, at fifty-four years 
of age Zhen was the eldest participant in my study. His adolescence had coincided with the 
Cultural Revolution, during which he was sent to the countryside, as was the case with many 
of his contemporaries. During his twenties, in the first decade of the reform era, he was strongly 
influenced by root-seeking literary works’ focus on masculine subjectivities coloured through 
images of song, dance and union with the natural world. After coming to the UK in the late 
1980s for postgraduate study, this self-styled “man of Chu” refused to return to post-
Tiananmen China. Yet despite his opposition to mainstream Confucian and CCP discourses, 
he was also a knowing subject whose resolution of his internal conflicts rested on the inherently 
patriarchal vision of untamed Chu culture sketched out by root-seeking writers.  
With the exception of the “man of Chu”, most of my participants’ critiques of British 
masculinity cohered around the notion of self-control and responsibility, which they believed 
that they, as Chinese men, possessed, whereas British men did not. Their views, including those 
of Xianyang and Bradley, echo historical Confucian expectations of self-restraint in men on 
the wen (literary) path, including the containment of sexual passion, as noted above, and the 
deeply embedded characterization of non-Chinese people as relatively unrefined (Dikötter 
1990). Their insistence on the superiority of a distinctly Chinese approach to family and gender 
relations, often through concepts central to the Confucian tradition, designates them as 
knowing male subjects; and, further, demonstrates their commitment to a Chinese spiritual-
cultural sphere built on a vision of a sublime Confucian moral order clearly differentiated from 
perceived Western values and practices. 
 
Conclusion 
The Confucian sublime is one of a number of alternatives to the Christian sublime of equality 
before God that continues to inform Western visions of societal perfection. In the face of 
globalization and the failures of socialism, people across the world are resorting to distinctive 
cultural identities to understand themselves and gain a sense of belonging to a particular society 
(Thomas 2005). In China, the urban middle class is increasingly turning to Confucianism (Pang 
2019: 197-228). The Confucian sublime offers an attractive vision for those well-educated 
Chinese men who feel the pain and humiliation of emasculation at personal and national levels. 
Its cosmopolitan, universalising tendencies, promulgated through concepts such as junzi and 
tianxia, provide a transcendent solution to the love/hate relationship they have with Western 
culture. Perceiving themselves as marginalized and emasculated by the CCP, Western men, 
and women’s “rise”,12 Chinese male intellectuals and highly educated professionals in the 
reform era are turning to deeply historically embedded models of masculinity to regain a sense 
of manhood and male privilege compatible with Chinese cultural identity in the modern world. 
As I have discussed above, this trend manifests in recent TV drama series, literary works and 
authorial personae, and in middle-class men’s self-representations. It is facilitated discursively 
at the highest levels of the CCP.  
Educated Chinese men’s “cosmopatriotic” domestication of aspects of Western 
business masculinities and cultivation of embedded Confucian masculinities constitutes a 
strategic effort to insert themselves more advantageously into local and global power relations 
of gender, class and nation. But the turn to a Chinese spiritual-cultural sphere also re-animates 
yearnings for the Confucian sublime (or minority alternatives such as the Chu cultural 
sublime), in which the lofty and the grandiose is associated with male power and integrity. 
While some contemporary proponents of the Confucian sublime may genuinely believe in its 
“magic power” to solve the world’s problems, their enthusiasm for it contributes to “a 
hegemonic practice calculated to reinforce the discursive formation of Confucian values and 
                                                 
12 For analysis of Chinese white-collar men’s anxieties about women’s demands for gender equality, see Song 
and Hird (2014) and Hird (2016a). 
thereby empower themselves in the contest for influence and control over national identity and 
the future directions of the nation” (Guo 2004: 88). The self-cultivating moral vision expressed 
through junzi, tianxia, and xiao ideals, propounded by Xianyang and Bradley and other 
“knowing male subjects” among my participants, echoes and reaffirms a culturalist, 
masculinist sublime that intrinsically disavows and represses the feminine. In this light, 
espousals of a junzi masculinity, no matter how principled their presentation, reflect and 
contribute to discursive practices and power relations that effect classed, gendered and sexual 
privileges for well-educated Chinese men. As I have shown, the culturalist and masculinist 
nationalism that has grown out of feelings of resentment and humiliation often facilitates or 
espouses male and Chinese chauvinism. 
Modernisation narratives argue that modern societies are typified by the disappearance 
of “tradition” and progressive change, resulting in greater individualism, social equality and 
democracy. Yet, the evidence shows the continuing significance of historical modes of 
masculinity for Chinese men today, and the persistence of patriarchal hierarchies in 
contemporary gender relations. These findings undermine modernisation narratives that posit 
China’s globalisation process as inevitably resulting in the jettisoning of “traditional” gender 
identities and practices and the disappearance of gender discrimination. The role of Chinese 
middle-class men in perpetuating class, gender, and other hierarchies complicates professional 
Chinese men’s claims of moral integrity, undermines the idea that the middle class is inherently 
progressive, and challenges the notion that economic development unproblematically delivers 
social democratisation.  
Envisioning Chinese middle-class masculinities as ambivalent, ambiguous, and 
contradictory helps facilitate a clearer view of China’s postsocialist modernity—the context in 
which these masculinities have emerged—as inherently conflicted; the latest iteration, as it 
were, of a process that began in the middle of the nineteenth century. In other words, 
ambivalent masculinities point to wider societal ambivalences. Indeed, it could be argued that 
China’s postsocialist modernity is constituted upon ambivalence, ambiguity and contradiction. 
Yet there are growing numbers of well-educated, knowing male subjects who now believe that 
the Confucian sublime resolves their anxieties about their own subjectivities and their nation’s 
place in the world. The Confucian sublime is an imaginary of increasing appeal to China’s 
middle-class men.  
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